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When indexical tenses such as present tense occur in intensional domains,  there is a 
mismatch between the actual content of the propositional attitude and the attitude 
reported. Consider for example: 
( 1 )  John believed that Mary is pregnant. 
(2) John will believe that Mary is pregnant. 
Here, the temporal interpretation of the embedded state may overlap with the 
believing time and the speech time (ST) (the double access reading, Abusch 1 99 1 ,  
1 997) .  But, intuitively, John ' s  beliefs do not include the ST, i .e . ,  a future or past 
time from John ' s  perspective. In ( 1 ) ,  for example, John presumably had a belief 
about Mary's pregnancy at a past interval (overlapping with the time of his belief) 
and not necessarily at an interval extending into his future to include the ST. This 
holds for (2) as well relative to the past. In both cases, the temporal reference to the 
ST does not coincide with the temporal belief the believer seems to have. 
Current solutions to this problem propose that there is a de re interpretation 
of the embedded tense, parallel to those found with regular NPs . In this paper, I 
argue that this solution is not entirely satisfactory because the de re interpretation 
does not make the correct predictions for cases in which the double access reading 
and the content-report mismatch obtain but the interpretation has the properties 
found in de dicto interpretations. As an alternative, I propose that reports containing 
indexical tenses involve an attribution of an implicit attitude similar to those 
traditionally acknowledged in the philosophical literature. I argue that such 
attributions are felicitous if there is an inference attainable in the common ground 
that allows the speaker to infer and assert the attributed content. The inference 
involves the hypothetically explicit content attributed to the attitude holder and 
pragmatic premises normally taken for granted. This account correctly predicts 
whether a given report is felicitous on the basis of the availability of the speaker' s 
inference. 
2. Previous solution 
The most extensive solutions proposed in the literature for present under past 
sentences are those in Abusch (199 1 ,  1997) and Ogihara ( 1 996) . They propose that 
embedded indexical tenses are interpreted de re, in a way parallel to de re 
interpretations of noun phrases . The embedded tense, rather than being part of the 
intentional content of the attitude holder, is the speaker' s  way to refer to the entity 
the belief is about. In the attitude worlds, this entity may be represented differently. 
The particular analysis of de re readings adopted from the nominal domain 
is that of Cresswell and Stechow ( 1982) . The analysis involves a res, i .e . , a thing 
or entity toward which the attitude is held. The object of belief is a structured 
meaning or centered worlds, a pair consisting of an individual and a property 
<b,P> , where b is the res of which the property P is predicated. The account also 
assumes following Kaplan ( 1968) and Lewis ( 1 979) that the res is presented to the 
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believer in a certain way via a causal connection. This is captured by postulating 
that there is a suitable cognitive relation R presupposed in the context between the 
believer and the res in the actual world. With these tools ,  Cresswell and Stechow 
define the truth conditions for de re belief reports : a believes P of b iff a bears some 
suitable relation R to b in the actual world w and every doxastic alternative w I of a 
satisfies the property of bearing R uniquely to something which has P in w'. 
To understand the intuition behind this definition, consider Quine' s  famous 
example of Ralph' s  beliefs. Ralph glimpsed a guy wearing a brown hat in the 
beach, who we identify as Ortcutt, and thinks that the guy is a spy. In this scenario,  
one can report Ralph' s  beliefs as Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy, where Ortcutt 
is interpreted de re given that Ralph does not represent the guy as Ortcutt. In this 
case, the acquaintance relation is a relation R such as x glimpses y in the beach. 
Then, Ralph believes Ortcutt to be a spy iff Ralph bears some acquaintance relation 
R to Ortcutt in the actual world and every doxastic alternative of Ralph is such that 
Ralph bears the relation R uniquely to someone who is a spy . This analysis thus 
captures the fact that there are different modes of presentation associated with the 
individual Ortcutt. The content of the acquaintance relation gives us the way Ralph 
represents the individual (the guy seen in the beach), while Ortcutt is the way the 
speaker refers to him. 
To apply this analysis to the temporal domain, the object of which an 
individual has a belief must be a temporal entity such as an interval or state. 
Consider the case of ( 1 )  repeated below: 
( 1 )  John believed that Mary is pregnant. 
John may have seen Mary once and thought she was pregnant, although she may 
have actually been overeating. In this scenario, John is acquainted with the state or 
interval of Mary' s  having a big belly, and he believes of this interval to be such that 
Mary is pregnant in it. Abusch represents this acquaintance relation as follows :  
(3) R3 : Atnow AX At AW [t is the maximal interval overlapping with tnow at which 
Mary has a big belly in w] 
RJ is a relation between the res interval t and the individual x in w at tnow' the time of 
the attitude or the believer' s now. It picks out the maximal interval overlapping with 
the believer' s now at which Mary has a big belly. As in Cresswell and Stechow' s  
proposal, the truth conditions are given in terms of the acquaintance relation and the 
property assigned to the res interval. The property P assigned to the interval is of 
type <i, <i, <w, t» >  (property of times) and is the property of being an interval 
such that Mary is pregnant in it. As before, the definition of belief says that ( 1 )  is 
true iff (a) there is a relation R that causally connects the res interval t with John at 
the time of believing tnow in the actual world w and (b) for all John ' s  cognitive 
alternatives,  the interval t to which John is acquainted in his belief worlds has the 
property of being the interval of Mary' s  pregnancy. 
Note however, that these truth conditions do not yield the double access 
reading of the embedded present tense. As they stand, they only guarantee via the 
causal connection R J that the interval picked out by R overlaps with the believing 
time (Le. , with tnow in (3» . Since both Abusch' s  and Ogihara' s accounts assume 
that present tense lexically refers to the ST (or to a non-past time), extra 
assumptions are needed to ensure that the interval referred to by the present tense is 
also the interval picked out by R which overlaps with the believing time. 
In Abusch' s system, the double access reading is accomplished by 
stipulating two temporal constraints on the denotation of temporal expressions. To 
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understand how these constraints work, first note that the embedded present tense 
moves to a higher position in LF in order to be interpreted de reo The resulting 
representation is the following (where the text at the nodes represents the 
corresponding type of the category): 
(4) S 
NP � VP 
I _________ 
John � «eiwt>iewt� 
believed Pres3<i> S<iiwt> 
-----------
At3 S<iwt> 
-----------
At2 S<wt> 
NP �VP 
. �  IS pregnant 
In (4) , the present tense Pres3 0verlaps with its evaluation time, the ST, rather than 
with the evaluation time of the base position t2 • Note that Abusch requires 
evaluation time abstractors for each of the temporal arguments within the embedded 
clause. She suggests that these times are counterparts in the belief worlds of the 
actual times denoted by the tenses. t2, the believer' s  now, is the counterpart in the 
belief worlds of Past}, the actual believing time. It represents the evaluation time of 
the embedded sentence. The trace TNS3 is the counterpart in the belief worlds of 
Pres3 that overlaps with the ST. At3, then, is the temporal property abstracted over 
the trace TNS3, i.e., the property of being a time such as that when evaluated 
relative to t2, Mary is pregnant in it. 
The proposed temporal constraints impose restrictions on both actual and 
believed (counterpart) times. First, the Upper Limit Constraint prevents TNS3 from 
referring to a time later than its local evaluation time t2 • This constraint stipulates 
that forward reference of tenses in intensional contexts is impossible because future 
times are not sufficiently determined from the perspective of the now of the attitude 
holder. The evaluation time is thus an upper limit for the denotation of embedded 
tenses. Second, the actual and the belief worlds are required to be isomorphic (I 
will call this the isomorphism constraint). That is, when the reference of Pres3 
overlaps with the believing time Past] in the actual world, the reference of TNS3 
overlaps with the believer' s  now in the belief worlds. With these two constraints, 
several logical possibilities regarding temporal readings are eliminated. For 
example, TNS3 cannot follow the believer's  now in the belief worlds because it 
cannot refer to a future time (the Upper Limit Constraint). In turn, it cannot precede 
the believer's  now because it must be isomorphic with the ST, which does not 
precede the believing time in the actual world. By the same isomorphism constraint, 
since TNS3 can thus only overlap with the believer' s  now, the reference of Pres3 
should also do so. The possibility that is left is the double access reading 
graphically represented in (5), where the slashes indicate the references of Pres3 and 
TNS3 in their respective world: 
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belief world ----'---------/1/1/ IV 1//1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1//1/1/-----------------------------------> 
believer' s  now t2 
auctual world ---------IIIIIIVIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIVIIIII--------------> 
believing time Past] ST 
The reference of Pres3 overlaps with the believing time and the ST in the base world 
while TNS3, the counterpart of Pres 3' overlaps with the believer' s  now in the belief 
worlds. Although the present tense only overlaps with the ST according to (4) , the 
temporal constraints guarantee that it also overlaps with the believing time. Thus ,  
the double access reading is  obtained. 
Note that, from the truth conditions above and these temporal constraints, it 
does not follow that at the belief worlds, Mary is pregnant at the ST. In these 
worlds, she has to be pregnant at the interval with which John is aucquainted via R 3 ' 
i .e. ,  the interval at which the symptoms persist. This interval in the belief worlds is 
independent from the ST and only overlaps with the believer' s  now. However, the 
interval reference of the de re constituent in the auctual world is such that it overlaps 
with the believing time and the ST. This is because the aucquaintance relation picks 
out the reference of the res constituent in the auctual world and the constraints on 
temporal relations lead to the double auccess interpretation in this world. The 
acquaintance relation thus picks out two different intervals in eauch world. 
Pragmatically, auccording to Abusch, these conditions amount to a presupposition 
that Mary' s symptoms overlap with both the believing and the utterance time. The 
res interval is what the speaker is taking for granted. Since this condition has to 
hold in the actual world for the sentence to be appropriate, the double access effect 
is achieved. Thus, the meaning of tenses, the de re analysis, the Upper Limit and 
isomorphism constraints give the right semantics for present under past reports. 
Consider now how the double auccess reading is auchieved in Ogihara's 
proposal. Ogihara proposes a de re analysis about states and requires in the truth 
conditions that the state in question obtains at the ST. Also, the analysis provides a 
mechanism to rule out occurrences of indexical tenses within intensional domains. 
This is auccomplished by postulating two different principles that amount to a ban on 
the occurrence of indexical expressions within intensional domains.  A consequence 
of these principles is that the embedded present tense should obligatorily move out 
of the intensional domain to the COMP level of the matrix sentence. The final 
representation at LF and the truth conditions are the following (taken from Ogihara 
1996) : 
( 1 )  a. LF: [cp Pres2 [ s John Past believe S2 [CPl that [s Mary SI be pregnant] ] ] ]  
b. 3s2[exist'(st,s2) & 3t[t<st & believe'(t,j ,s2,AAt3Asl [be-preg'(s l 'm)])] ]
1 
s is a state and exist is an "operator" such that [[existJJ(s)(t)= 1 iff t is included in 
the duration of s .  According to the proposed truth conditions for de re attitude 
verbs, ( lb) is true iff there is a state S2 at the ST such that John in the past ascribes 
to S2 the property of being a state of Mary's being pregnant. More precisely, the 
sentence is true iff (a) there is a state S2 at the ST and an acquaintance relation R that 
relates John uniquely to this state S2 in w at the believing time t, and (b) for all 
doxastic alternatives <w', t ',x'> of John in w at t, John bears the relation R in w ' at 
t '  uniquely to some state, which is the state of Mary' s being pregnant in w ' at t ' . 
The double auccess reading is captured because the truth conditions require that (a) 
the attitude holder and the res state are aucquainted at the time of the attitude t, i . e . ,  
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the res state overlaps with the believing time t, and, (b) the res state exists at the ST .  
By definition, the res state thus overlaps with both the ST and the believing time. 
3. Problems with the de re analysis 
There are two main problems that challenge the de re account. The first one 
concerns its failure to explain all reports containing embedded indexical tenses . 
Note that both Abusch' s  and Ogihara' s de re accounts rely on two pragmatic 
conditions imposed on the actual world. One is the truth requirement that there be 
an acquaintance relation that picks out some relevant state in the actual world, 
although not necessarily the state denoted by the complement sentence. The other is 
the truth requirement or constraint that the state to which the believer is acquainted 
also obtains at the ST. If these conditions do not obtain, the double access reading 
and the content-report mismatch would not be explained. For example, in ( 1 ) , if 
Mary does not have a big belly at the ST, the interval picked out by the acquaintance 
relation in the actual world would not be an interval overlapping with both the 
believing time and the ST. In such a case, the attribution would be considered 
infelicitous or false. 
There are, however, examples in which one or both of these conditions are 
not met, although the double access reading and/or the content-report mismatch still 
obtain. Consider the following. Imagine a situation in which Mary intentionally 
wanted to appear fat in order to deceive her boyfriend John. She wants him to 
marry her and she believes a pregnancy would force the issue. She has used a 
pillow under her shirt on several occasions. Her boyfriend is now in a business trip 
and Mary is of course not fat any more, as in fact, she never was.  In this context, it 
is perfectly fine to utter (6) : 
(6) John believed that Mary is pregnant and that he' ll have to marry her. 
Here, John is only acquainted with Mary's pillow state in the past. The condition 
that the state with which the believer is acquainted obtains in the actual world at the 
ST does not hold. Consider also the following case: 
(7) Betty told little Bill the Santa Claus is preparing his gift. 
In (7), the attitude holder does not have to be acquainted with any actual state that 
overlaps with both the attitude time and the ST, as the de re account requires. In 
both situations (6) and (7), the reports would be predicted false or infelicitous and 
both the content-report mismatch and the double access reading would not be 
explained2• 
Similar considerations arise for the case of generic beliefs . Consider the 
following: 
(8) Socrates believed that the soul is located in the stomach. 
(9) Scientists believed that the human mind starts to develop long after birth. 
( 1 0) Skinner denied that the mind exists. 
As in (6) , the most natural interpretation of these sentences suggests that the 
existence of a state or interval overlapping with both the ST and the believing time 
in the actual world is not required. Similarly, there does not seem to be an 
acquaintance relation between the believer and some actual state or interval that, as 
in the Ortcutt case, gives us the believer' s representation of the state. Socrates may 
have believed the complement of (8) as a statement compatible with his system of 
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beliefs, without being acquainted with any particular state that also obtains at the 
ST. Rather, as in (7) , the state or interval in question may only exist de dicto in the 
belief worlds, challenging the adequacy of the de re analysis. 
There are, however, two possible objections to this reasoning. In defense of 
the de re account, one could argue that these cases involve some sort of actual 
generic state with which the believer is acquainted. For example, one could imagine 
that Socrates in (8) was acquainted with the state of humans behaving the way they 
do and he believed of this state to be the state of the soul being located in the 
stomach. However, the question arises as to what the acquaintance relation really is 
and how it is constrained. Note that it is normally the case that believers have de 
dicto or de re beliefs because their mental states are causally connected to their 
experience (Stalnaker 1984) . If I believe that the table is brown, normally, it is 
because the table is brown, or because I believe something that entails this 
proposition. The vagueness inherent in the notion of acquaintance relation thus 
makes the de re account able to explain virtually any belief, hence the relatively 
unusual example mentioned in (7) . It will normally be the case that the believer is 
ultimately connected to some state in the actual world. Unless further constraints are 
specified, the acquaintance relation is not sufficient to explain those beliefs for 
which the existence of a related res state is not easily identifiable. 
The other objection in defense of the de re account is to say that the present 
tense involved in generic sentences is not the same present tense (or the same use of 
the tense) as that of double access sentences. However, there is no a priori reason 
to assume this .  In fact, there are reasons that suggest that such an assumption is not 
correct. First, generic sentences are no restricted to present sentences so that their 
particular interpretation does not come from the present tense. Second, the 
genericity of sentences such as (8)-( 10) is usually taken to come from a generic 
operator (cf. Carlson and Pelletier, 1995) and not from the use of a different present 
tense. Also, the problems posed by these sentences are similar to those of (6) and 
(7) , which are not generic sentences. Given this, I prefer to assume that the 
meaning of the present tense is one and the same in all occurrences and that an 
appropriate unifying account would explain all cases.  Thus, the two possible 
objections to the problem of belief reports , if taken seriously, in fact reveal other 
problematic assumptions and potential difficulties implicit in the de re analysis. 
The second main problem that challenges the de re account concerns its 
failure to account for double access readings in which there is no content-report 
mismatch involved. Note that there are relative clauses in which the double access 
reading obtains but the characteristics of de re attitudes are not present: 
( 1 1 )  John met the guy who lives downstairs . 
( 1 2) John hired an engineer who has two graduate degrees . 
In ( 1 1 )  the interval of living overlaps the past meeting time and the ST. The de 
dicto/de re distinction (or Quine' s  opaque vs .  transparent notion) is relevant only 
when intensional domains are involved. But ( 1 1 )  and ( 1 2) contain no such 
domains .  There is no content-report mismatch or de re attribution that would justify 
the adoption of the de re analysis as presently formulated. For these examples, 
Abusch and Ogihara' s theories assume that QR may apply, moving the object NP to 
the CP. Regardless of whether QR applies or the object NP stays in situ, the 
analyses yield a temporal reading of the present tense that overlaps with the ST, due 
to the lexical meaning of the tense. Thus, the double access reading is not 
explained3 • 
In sum, there are examples in which the requirements of the de re analysis 
and the characteristics of de re readings are not met. This shows that this analysis 
does not systematically explain the double access reading and/or the content-report 
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mismatch. The de re mechanism either misanalyzes these cases or leaves them 
unexplained. This thus casts doubts on the empirical adequacy of generally 
adopting a de re analysis to explain the content-report mismatch and the double 
access reading of cases such as ( 1 )  and (2) . 
4. Alternative solution 
Given the problems of the de re accounts, I maintain that the content-report 
mismatch of sentences such as ( 1 )  and (2) occurs because the reports of these 
sentences are reports of implicit or tacit attitudes,  i .e . , the content reported differs 
from that explicitly believed but follows from it, given the addition of certain 
pragmatic assumptions. Also, I argue that the double access reading directly 
follows from the appropriate semantic definition of the present tense and is 
somewhat independent of the problem of the content-report mismatch. The 
mismatch occurs because of the characteristics of the speaker' s  act of attribution; the 
double access reading occurs because of the semantics of the tenses involved. The 
speaker chooses to report an implicit attitude that happens to be conveyed by the 
semantics of the present tense. The choice of the present tense thus correlates with 
the report of an implicit attitude but such reports are not restricted to double access 
readings . 
4. 1 .  The double access reading 
To start with, consider how the temporal reading and the truth conditions of present 
under past reports are obtained. The crucial assumption to obtain the correct 
interpretation is the definition of the meaning of present tense. In my dissertation, I 
analyze the behavior of the present tense in both independent and embedded 
contexts and propose a semantic definition that account for its interpretations in all 
environments: The meaning of present requires the proposition it modifies (a) to 
overlap with the local evaluation time and (b) not to be located before the ST .  
Formally, its meaning i s  Ai 3i ' [i ' 0 i & -(i '  < st) & �i ')l, where 0 means overlap 
with, i is the evaluation time and i' the interval at which cp is true. The motivation to 
propose this meaning is that present tense has a non-past perspective and could be 
true at a future interval if embedded under future (as in (2» , i .e . ,  the present tense 
can denote any non-past interval overlapping with the local evaluation time without 
necessarily referring to the ST (for a discussion, see Gennari 1 999) . This meaning 
agrees in spirit with several proposals (Kamp & Reyle 1993 and Abusch 1 997) in 
which the temporal perspective of present is considered to be non-past. Also, 
Abusch ( 1 988) proposes a definition of present tense where the interval denoted 
overlaps with both the evaluation time and the ST. The novelty of this definition is 
that the references to the ST and to the evaluation time are put together in a way that 
is particularly suited to account for embedded sentences. 
For the case of present under past reports such as that of ( 1 ) , the result of 
the semantic composition is as follows: 
( 1 )  John believed that Mary is pregnant. 
3 i [i< st & believe'(i, j ,  1\3i ' [i ' 0 i & -,(i' < st) & be-preg'(i ' ,m)] )t 
This says that ( 1 )  is true iff there is an interval i prior to the ST at which for all of 
John ' s  belief worlds, there is an interval i' such that (a) it overlaps with i ,  John ' s  
believing time, (b) it is not an interval before the ST, and (c) Mary i s  pregnant at it. 
Note that by definition of the before and after relations, -(i'<st) means that i' is not 
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wholly located before the ST. Thus, an interval i '  that overlaps with the past 
believing interval i and is not wholly located before the ST, necessarily requires that 
i' overlaps with both the past believing interval i and the ST. The resulting situation 
is depicted in ( 3) ,  where the slashes represent the interval denoted by the present 
tense. A similar result obtains for the case of relative clauses such as ( 1 ) and ( 2) ,  
in which the interval denoted by the present tense overlaps with the time o f  the past 
main verbS . 
( 1 3) ----------------\ \\ \ V\ \\ \ \\ \\ \\ \\ \ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ V\ \ \ \ \----------------------------> 
i i 'oi & -,(i'<st) st 
The truth conditions thus yield an interpretation of ( 1 )  in which it follows from 
what John believed at i, that Mary is pregnant during an interval overlapping with 
the believing time i and the ST. However, these truth conditions also seem to 
commit the believer to a belief about an interval overlapping with a future time, the 
ST from the perspective of the speaker. To address this issue, I argue here that such 
a commitment need not be assumed if the speaker' s  report is viewed as a report of 
an implicit attitude, rather than an explicit one representing John ' s  literal belief. A 
content inferred by the speaker with the aid of common sense assumptions is not 
necessarily part of what the believer actually had in mind. 
4.2. The content-report mismatch 
In 0),  John did not actually have a belief about an interval extending into the future 
from his past perspective, but his belief entailed that the embedded state was true in 
the past and would be true in the future, given the speaker' s  addition of pragmatic 
assumptions normally taken for granted. The speaker attributes to John typical 
assumptions and knowledge of the world from which the implicit content reported 
logically follows. If John believed at a time before the ST that Mary was pregnant, 
the speaker could infer that John believed that she was pregnant and would be 
pregnant for a while, given that John has rational beliefs and normal knowledge 
about pregnancy. Before uttering the sentence in 0) ,  the speaker goes through an 
inference schematically represented as follows: 
(4) (a) John believed that Mary was pregnant at t. 
(b) John' s belief worlds are coherent. 
(c) John believed that Mary had a normal pregnancy. 
(d) John knew that pregnancies typically last for an interval i including t. 
(e) i includes a future time t' (the ST from the speaker' s perspective) . 
�John believed that Mary is pregnant at i including t and t'. 
From the speaker' s  perspective, the future time t' in John ' s  worlds is the ST. Note 
that this account requires that the embedded interval denoted by the present tense in 
( 1 )  exists in the belief worlds, rather than in the actual world. The inference that 
Mary's  pregnancy obtains at a future time t' holds in the belief worlds . Moreover, 
the actual belief may only be about a past interval (premise (a)) . The speaker' s  
pragmatic inference concludes the pregnancy at the ST implicit in John' s  beliefs ,  
given normal assumptions and typical knowledge. The notion of implicit report, 
traditionally acknowledged (cf. Stalnaker 1984) , is further constrained here by the 
existence of a pragmatic inference, the premises of which (if any) should be taken 
for granted in the common ground. In particular, I propose that an implicit report 
such as that in 0)  is felicitous, if there is an inference attainable in the common 
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ground that allows the speaker to infer the attributed content. This is because, by 
the very nature of implicit attitudes, the speaker cannot assume any proposition as 
part of the belief worlds . Rather, he/she may assume those propositions that are 
normally taken for granted, i .e . ,  those that constitute common knowledge and 
default assumptions. This is the crucial difference that distinguishes report of 
implicit attitude from de re reports. 
Note that premise (c) of ( 14) schematically represents other premises also 
implicitly assumed by the speaker. For example, John did not think at the time of 
the belief that Mary was about to give birth, or John did not have any reason to 
think that Mary would not have a normal and full term pregnancy. These are part of 
normal assumptions that the speaker takes for granted in the common ground and 
thus attributes to the believer. This correctly predicts that if the speaker knew that 
John thought that Mary's  situation was somewhat atypical (for example, that Mary 
was sick and could loose the child) , the present under past report would be 
infelicitous. 
Two pieces of evidence support this account. First, the pragmatic 
assumptions of ( 14) are independently motivated on other pragmatic assumptions 
that interlocutors normally assume when making and interpreting attitude reports. 
As several studies have pointed out (ct. Stalnaker ( 1 984) ,  Barwise and Perry 
( 1 983),  Mc Cawley ( 1 978),  Farkas ( 1992» , when the speaker makes an attitude 
report, he/she normally assumes that (a) attitude holders are rational beings, i . e . ,  
belief worlds tend to be coherent (I call this assumption the normality principle) ;  
and (b) that the belief worlds agree with the actual world (or with the version of the 
actual world that the speaker presupposes) in all relevant respects except for those 
in which the speaker has given the hearer reasons to believe that they may differ 
(equal knowledge principle) . These assumptions are clearly operative in ( 1 4) .  Since 
the believer is rational (premise (b» , has typical knowledge about the world and 
makes normal assumptions about Mary's  situation as presupposed in the utterance 
context (premises (c) and (d» , the speaker can infer that the believer' s worlds are 
such that they entail the persistence of certain state. 
The second piece of evidence supporting this account comes from the 
existence of implicit reports other than those involving a temporal inference. The 
philosophical literature about attitudes has pointed out the need for such a notion to 
account for reports that intuitively seem neither literal belief report nor de re (cf. 
Stalnaker 1984) . Consider for example, the following: 
( 1 5) Russell believed that Frege' s  ear lobe was smaller than The Big Ben. 
( 1 6) President Clinton said that the country is doing well. 
In ( 15),  Russell presumably did not have this explicit belief but it follows from the 
general pragmatic knowledge attributed to him by the speaker. The attribution of a 
belief may take for granted beliefs of which the believer is not aware. In ( 1 6) ,  
uttered in a situation in which Clinton has given his two hour State of  the Union 
speech, the president actually did not utter the complement but it was implied by his 
speech and everything his speech presupposed. Attributions thus do not necessarily 
represent explicit contents because they can be made on the basis of an inference 
whose premises are attainable in the common ground6 • 
Thus, this account only requires the standard semantic analysis of belief­
reports, while the speaker is responsible for the use of the present tense with its 
corresponding semantic interpretation via hislher own pragmatic inference. What 
creates the intuition that the speaker misrepresents the original belief is the inference 
process the speaker goes through in the report, which in most cases, attributes a 
stronger belief than the original content, given the premises added to the belief 
worlds. 
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5. Predictions 
5 . 1 .  Non-existent and discontinuous states 
The approach proposed in the previous section can predict why examples 
presupposing discontinuous states in the actual world are not acceptable. These 
examples have been used in the literature to support the claim that the state with 
which the believer is acquainted should obtain in the actual world at an interval 
overlapping with the believing time and the ST. Consider for example, a case 
slightly different from one given by Ogihara: 
( 1 7) John and Bill are looking into a room. Sue is in the room. 
John (nearsighted) : Look! Mary is standing in the room. 
Bill: What are you talking about? That' s Sue, not Mary. 
On the following day, Bill and Kent return to the same location and are now 
looking into the same room. Sue is standing there. 
Bill (to Kent) : # John believed yesterday that Mary is standing in the room. 
But that' s Sue not Mary. 
The attitude report in ( 17) is infelicitous. This is because under normal 
assumptions, an inference such as that in ( 14) applied to this case would not 
normally follow. Consider how the inference would be formulated: 
( 1 8) (a) John believed that Mary was in the room at t. 
(b) John' s belief worlds are coherent. 
(c) John believed that Mary was in a typical state of being in the room. 
(d) John knew that a state such as being in a room typically lasts for an 
interval i including t. 
(e) *i includes a future time t' (the ST from the speaker' s  perspective) . 
� *John believed that Mary is in the room at i including t and f.  
To obtain the reported content the speaker should assume that the state in question 
would typically hold in the belief worlds for a period i that includes the ST (premise 
(d» . However, this assumption does not hold because it contradicts common sense 
knowledge about the duration of the state. John likely believed that Sue would 
stand there for a while but not until next day. Temporary states such as that of 
standing in a room cannot be typically assumed to hold for long periods . Neither 
the speaker nor the believer would normally take this for granted. 
This type of pragmatic reasoning also makes the right predictions for cases 
in which no actual state obtains at the ST. According to the equal knowledge 
principle, such attributions should make available in the context that the believer 
does not have access to the same information the speaker presupposes . This is the 
case of (6) , where Mary deceives her boyfriend: 
(6) John believed that Mary is pregnant and that he' ll have to marry her. 
In the context provided, the speaker knows that Mary was never pregnant but can 
assume that she was and would be in the belief worlds since John was deceived. 
Likewise for Socrates' example (8), since given what we know about him, such a 
generic belief would follow from his past beliefs regardless of what happens at the 
ST in the actual world. Note, however, that these examples do not violate common 
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sense assumptions about the duration of states as in ( 1 8) .  The reported belief is 
compatible with common sense assumptions and what is presupposed in the 
common ground so that the report can be felicitous, although no state may obtain at 
the ST in the actual world. Thus, the examples of this section show that the felicity 
of a present under past report depends on whether a pragmatic inference can be 
constructed according to what is normally taken for granted in the common ground. 
If what the speaker assumes in the belief worlds is incompatible with the 
presupposed context, the inference is not available. 
5.2.  The generic/episodic contrast 
If it is correct that the speaker makes an inference that assumes common knowledge 
about the typical duration of states, one would expect variations in the acceptability 
of present under past reports depending on the degree of reliability of such an 
assumption. This is an issue particularly for those embedded states that may not 
hold between the time of the attitude and the ST as exemplified in ( 1 8) .  If common 
knowledge does not support the inference, the report should be unacceptable. In 
contrast, if no issue arises as to whether the embedded state can hold for the period 
specified, the sentence should be fine. This is indeed what we find. Note that 
among the stative sentences that can occur embedded under past, there are at least 
two classes corresponding to the distinctions between generic vs.  episodic 
sentences (Carlson 1977, Kratzer 1988 ,  Cherchia, 1 995) . At the level of lexical 
stative verbs, this distinction corresponds to the distinction between individual level 
and stage level predicates. Sentences containing individual level predicates and 
generic sentences in general express permanent or typically stable properties . In 
contrast, sentences containing stage level predicates express temporary qualities or 
states .  
It should become clear now why the generic/non-generic distinction has an 
effect on the acceptability of present under past attributions.  This is so because 
temporary states (stage level predicates) will yield awkward sentences if they are 
asserted to hold for periods that are longer than what one would normally expect 
according to world knowledge. Consider for example: 
( 1 9) ??Last year, John believed/told me that Mary is pregnant. 
(20) ??Last week, the dean told me that Ms. Jones is sad. 
(2 1 )  ?Last month, the secretary told the dean that Ms. Jones i s  upset with him. 
Compare these sentences with the following: 
(8) Socrates believed that the soul is located in the stomach. 
(9) Scientists believed that human psychology starts to develop after birth. 
(22) I used to believe that dogs and cats love each other. 
(23) Last week, the dean told me that Ms. Jones is walking/walks to school. 
Generic sentences (both habitual and with individual level predicates) are fine no 
matter how long ago the attitude took place. They do not require specific conditions 
to be acceptable when embedded under past because the original generic belief 
contained quantification over typical situations (the sentence is habitually true) ,  and 
therefore, it logically entails that the embedded sentence is true for a period 
encompassing the believing time and the ST. The presence of the inference is 
pragmatically unquestionable and does not require extra common sense 
assumptions. In contrast, temporary states hold for periods that are grounded in 
typical knowledge so they are most likely to yield infelicitous present under past 
sentences if common sense assumptions are not satisfied (as in ( 1 8)) .  The less 
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likely the assumption, the less felicitous the sentence, hence the various degrees of 
acceptability. In general, the presence of an inference more or less pragmatically 
grounded (including logical inferences as those unquestionably grounded) 
determines the felicity of present under past reports. 
5 . 3 .  Other pragmatic factors 
Consider a situation such as that in ( 1 )  in which Mary was pregnant, had the baby 
and got pregnant again. John saw Mary a month ago but he does not know 
anything about Mary' s present state or Mary' s having the baby. In this situation, 
the report in ( 1 ) ,  John believed that Mary is pregnant, is infelicitous.  The de re 
account handles this case via the requirement that the state obtaining in the actual 
world overlaps with both the ST and the believing time. In my account, no state is 
required to exist in the actual world but John still has a belief about one state rather 
than two, since the meaning of the present tense forces the embedded proposition to 
be true throughout the interval overlapping with the believing time and the ST .  
However, since the context makes explicit that John's worlds continued to be the 
same since he saw Mary and the interval intervening between the believing time and 
the ST does not violate normal assumptions about pregnancies, it is therefore 
possible to infer the conclusion of a present under past report .  This case would be 
like those cases discussed earlier in which no actual state obtains at the ST. 
Note however that there are other pragmatic reasons to rule out reports such 
as ( 1 )  in the context described. In a situation where the speaker knows that there 
were two pregnancies involved, it would be simply uncooperative to utter ( 1 ) ,  since 
the speakers does not provide all the information that is relevant for the situation. 
This is also true for the past version of ( 1 ) .  For the speaker to be informative, 
he/she must report John' s belief in a way that clearly characterizes John ' s  beliefs 
against what is presupposed in the speaker' s  context. In the context given, the 
speaker actually means something like (24) : 
(24) John thought that Mary is/was still pregnant from the first pregnancy? 
Therefore, using ( 1 )  or its past version would be misleading, since it does not make 
clear to the hearer what John actually has in mind, given the actual situation. 
In terms of Stalnaker's ( 1 978) theory of assertion, the asserted report does 
not satisfy the conditions for a felicitous assertion: The speaker does not distinguish 
between the possible worlds of the current common ground, thus making the 
proposition false in some worlds and true in others . An assertion that is true in all 
(relevant) worlds of the common ground is infelicitous. For example, ( 1 )  does not 
distinguish between a belief about the first or the second pregnancy. According to 
Heim ( 1992), a belief report such as ( 1 )  instructs one to exclude from the common 
ground those worlds in which John does not believe that Mary is pregnant. But 
since in this case, John can have such a belief regarding one of the two states (e . g .  
John does not believe that Mary was pregnant for the second time), the speaker' s 
contribution is not clear and the assertion is not felicitous .  This captures Gricean 
informativeness principle in a precise way:  the assertion was not informative 
enough relative to the current common ground. Thus, the contrast between (24) and 
( 1 )  in the context provided suggests that in addition to the common sense 
assumptions discussed above, other general pragmatic principles such as Gricean 
cooperation and informativeness principles may determine the acceptability of 
present under past reports. 
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6 . Some puzzles on acceptability: the present attitude 
The acceptability of present under past belief reports seems to be affected by the 
beliefs the believer holds at the ST. If it is known in the common ground that the 
belief that was held in the past is no longer held at the ST, the present under past 
attribution is not felicitous. This is a problem for all accounts, since the 
explanations rely on the belief the believer had in the past (or the state the believer 
was acquainted with at a past time) . Interestingly, this contrasts with verbal 
attitudes such as those introduced by say, tell, announce, etc . .  In such cases, 
whether the attitude holder still holds an attitude at the ST is irrelevant for the 
felicity of the report. Consider the following: 
(25) John and Bill are looking into a room. Sue is in the room. 
John (nearsighted) : Look! Mary is in the room. 
Bill: What are you talking about? That' s Sue, not Mary. 
John: Yes, your are right. That 's  Mary. 
One minute later, Kent joins them. Bill (to Kent) : 
a. John said that Mary is in the room. 
b. # John believed that Mary is in the room. 
(26) John knows that Mary lives in California now. 
a. # However, for a while, he believed that Mary lives in Boston and 
expected to call her up to go out together. 
b. However, last week, he said that Mary lives in Boston and made 
everybody believe so. 
(27) John believed that Mary lives in Boston and expected to call her up to go out 
together. However, he found out yesterday that she lives in California. 
If the possibility that the believer changed his mind is available in the common 
ground, belief attributions, as opposed verbal ones, are not acceptable. However, 
the order of presentation in the discourse yields a difference in acceptability, since 
(27) is fine. Facts of this nature support my pragmatic account, since the 
information available in the common ground at the time of the attribution has an 
effect on felicity. The contrast between verbal and cognitive attitudes,  however, is a 
puzzling fact for which I do not have a definitive answer, although I will suggest a 
possible explanation rooted in the meaning of these attitudes. 
Attitudes such as belief, as opposed to knowledge, are subject to revision. 
Note that even if I am sure that yesterday I believed that the secretary was and 
would be pregnant today, after I found out that I was wrong, I cannot report my 
past belief today with embedded present tense. This would be so even if I can 
attribute to myself all the necessary premises for the inference or, on terms of the de 
re account, even if the state I was acquainted with still obtains (e.g . ,  the secretary 
was not pregnant but just fat) . Belief worlds are stable and tend to be coherent. 
New evidence causes re-interpretations of past beliefs . Given this, one could argue 
that reports attributing implicit beliefs are also implicitly subject to a ceteris paribus 
condition: the speaker' s inference is valid all other things being equal, i .e . ,  it is 
taken for granted that the believer does not have access to new evidence that proves 
the belief wrong. In such a case, a revision of the content would take place and 
from the perspective of the ST, the past belief would not entail any more that the 
state in question persists at the ST. 
This contrasts with reports of verbal attitudes. Such reports introduce the set 
of worlds that the attitude holder presupposed in the original speech act, rather than 
belief worlds. These worlds may but need not be stable, and do not commit the 
attitude holder with the truth of hislher statement or a certain view of the world. S o ,  
they are not subject to revisions and no ceteris paribus condition i s  necessary. Even 
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if the attitude holder now knows that hislher past speech is false, this does not 
undermine hislher present or past verbal acts. 
Note that under this view, the ceteris paribus condition constitutes an 
implicit premise of the speaker' s inference. Thus, it is subject to the same kind of 
pragmatic constraints we have indicated for other premises. The condition will 
hold, as long as the common ground does not contradict it. This explains why (27) 
is fine. At the point the attribution is made, the ceteris paribus condition can be 
assumed in the inference, since the common ground does not presuppose that a 
revision took place. Therefore, no conflict arises. This contrasts with (25 .a) and 
(26.a) ,  where the common ground denies the condition. 
7. Present under future 
Present under future sentences in their double access reading have similar 
characteristics to present under past ones. Consider, for example: 
(28) The dean will say that Ms. Jones is his wife. 
3 i [i>st & say'(i, j ,  A3i '  [i' 0 i & -'(i'<st) & be-wife'(i ' ,  m)] )] 
(29) The dean will believe that John' s records are not good enough. 
3i[i>st & believe'(i ,the-dean', A3 i' [i 'oi & -,(i'<st) & -'be-good' ( i ' ,  
john' s-records')])] 
Note that by the above definition of the present tense, the two temporal readings in 
these sentences are obtained. The condition of not being an interval prior to the ST 
can be satisfied in different ways. For example, (28) is true in two possible 
situations:  when Mary is John' s wife at some future interval overlapping with 
John ' s  saying time and when Mary is currently John' s wife and continues to be 
until John ' s  saying time. In the first case, the event time of the present complement 
i '  is a future interval overlapping with the future local evaluation time. In the other 
case, this interval is extended enough to overlap with the ST and the future local 
evaluation time. Whether the embedded interval overlaps with the ST will be 
determined by the context. 
As in the case of present under past, when the double access reading 
obtains, the speaker attributes an implicit future attitude based on an inference 
including common sense assumptions. The speaker attributes an attitude that will be 
such that, given normal assumptions, it will entail something true about the past of 
the attitude time (the ST), although the attitude holder may not know this at the ST .  
The difference with present under past reports i s  that what i s  entailed by  the belief 
worlds looks backward instead of forward, i .e . ,  once the believer acquires certain 
knowledge, hislher view of the past will change. For example, in (29) ,  the dean 
will believe that John' s records are bad at a future time t. But, since the dean will 
learn that John' s records are generally bad at an interval i including t, and since i 
includes t-1 (the ST), it follows that the dean will believe that John ' s  records are 
bad at an interval including t-1 .  (28) behaves similarly, except that here, since a 
verbal attitude is involved, the dean will not necessarily acquire a new belief, as 
(29) suggests, but could say what he/she already knows.  
This analysis is  supported by facts similar to those found with present under 
past reports regarding the continuity and actuality of the states involved. Assuming 
a context such as that in (6) where Mary is about to deceive her boyfriend with a 
pillow, the future under past report need not require the currency of the state in 
question at the ST: 
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(30) John will think that Mary is pregnant. 
(3 1 )  Humans will never know whether there is life on other galaxies. 
At a future time, John will think that Mary was and has been pregnant, given the 
characteristics of this state, although no state may obtain at the ST. In addition, a 
state obtaining at the actual world is not required as (3 1 )  shows. Thus, the 
inferential approach correctly accounts for these cases. 
Present under future reports are also similar to present under past ones with 
respect to the contrast observed between generic and episodic complements. 
Generic complements are usually fme independently of the time intervening 
between the ST and the future attribution, while the felicity of temporary states with 
the double access reading depends on �hether the assumption that the complement 
state holds for the indicated period is pragmatically attainable: 
(32) Next year, the dean will believe that John is sad. 
(33) Next year, the dean will believe that the secretary is pregnant. 
(34) The dean will believe that Ms. Jones is not trustworthy. 
(35) The students will think that Socrates is the greatest philosopher of all times. 
In the double access reading, the speaker should infer from normal pragmatic 
assumptions that the complement state would remain true from the attribution time 
backward to the ST, unless he/she has given reasons to suspend them. If such 
assumptions are unattainable in the common ground as in (32) and (33) ,  for the 
same kinds of pragmatic reasons indicated for present under past, the double access 
reading will not arise. Thus, these brief considerations and the parallelisms noted 
with present under past attributions suggest that the general approach proposed for 
present under past sentences extends to the case of present under future. 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have argued that the adoption of a de re analysis to account for 
indexical tenses within intensional domains does not make the correct predictions.  
In contrast, I have proposed an alternative account, which relies on a definition of 
the present tense and the fact that attitude reports can attribute implicit contents. This 
notion is important because it provides an alternative view to account for reports 
that do not intuitively seem de reo Reports of implicit attitudes are such that their 
felicity is conditioned to the existence of an inference pragmatically attainable. 
Although more study is needed to determine the general adequacy of this notion, the 
solution proposed for the temporal cases analyzed here requires the standard 
possible worlds semantics of attitudes and a pragmatic theory of attitude reports that 
constrains the speaker' s  inferential attribution. In contrast with current accounts, the 
proposal is simple and relies on principles and notions motivated by independent 
facts of the grammar. The approach also simplifies the syntax-semantics interface 
and correctly predicts the felicity of the reports under consideration. 
Endnotes 
(*) I am in debt to Craige Roberts for conversations that inspired this article and to 
Pauline Jacobson for innumerable comments that improved it. 
1 It is not clear to me why AtJ does not bind any variable in the embedded 
proposition. This is the representation given in Ogihara ( 1996) , p. 2 1 2- 14. 
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2 Note that it does not matter that in (7), Betty lies to little Bill. From the perspective 
of the speaker, the attribution could be true. 3 A further potential problem for the de re account are multiply embedded present 
sentences. Consider the following: 
(a) Mary suspected that her father thinks that he has cancer. 
In these cases, the innermost intervaVstate denoted need not be analyzed de re. The 
analyses would require that there is an acquaintance relation in the actual world that 
connects the father in (a) to some actual state. However, Mary could be mistaken 
about her father' s  beliefs and misrepresent his mental state. In such case, the de re 
account predicts that the attribution in (a) would be false or infelicitous, although it 
does not have to be so. It should be noted, however, that Abusch' s  and Ogihara' s 
accounts do not actually discuss multiply embedded cases. So,  some other 
mechanism could be brought in to deal with them. Ogihara, for example, proposes 
an optional tense deletion rule that applies to embedded tenses given their identity 
with the matrix tense. If the rule deletes the tense, the embedded sentence is 
interpreted as overlapping the immediately higher tense. However, since the tense 
deletion rule is optional, it is not clear what happens when the rule does not apply. 
4 Note that the semantic representation given for ( 1 )  admits the occurrence of 
indexicals within the intensional domain. This is something that the de re accounts 
have banned by means of different ad hoc constraints. The motivation for this ,  
according to Ogihara, is that the believer does not have "access" to the ST. This sort 
of constraints forces the movement of the present tense outside the intensional 
domain. My take on this problem is that the occurrence of indexical tenses within 
intensional domains is not problematic if one assumes a theory of attitudes such as 
that of Stalnaker ( 1 98 1 ,  1987, 1 990) . This theory challenges the assumptions of de 
re accounts such as those proposed by Lewis ( 1 979) and Cresswell and Stechow 
( 1 982) . In contrast with the structured meaning approach, Stalnaker' s  framework 
assumes that the object of an attitude is simply an abstract proposition, which could 
be denoted by several different sentences. The occurrence of an indexical 
expression in a complement sentence does not mean that the believer has access to 
the ST. It only means that the propositional content of the belief is a function of the 
time denoted by the present tense, but this proposition is independent from the 
indexical means by which the time is specified. In ( 1 ) ,  for example, John does not 
have a belief about the ST, but an (implicit) belief about an interval that includes the 
time denoted by "st" , not the expression "st" itself. As Kaplan ( 1 989) and Numberg 
( 1993) have pointed out, the deictic component of indexical expressions is not part 
of the proposition expressed. Indexicals are the speaker' s  handy means to express 
the abstract proposition object of the attitude. 
S The representation of a relative clause such as that of ( 1 1 )  is the following: 
( 1 1 )  John met the guy who lives downstairs. 
3i[kst & 3x[guy'(i,x) & meet'(i ,j ,x) & 3i ' [i 'o i & -,(i'<st) & l ive ' ( i ' , x ,  
downstairs ') ] ]  
This gives a reading in which the interval of living overlaps with the meeting time. 
There also is another possible reading obtained by the application of QR. In this 
case, the present tense is outside the scope of the main past tense, yielding a purely 
present reading, as in the following example: 
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( 1 1 ') John met the guy who is (now) coming up the stairs . 
At [3i' [i'ot & -,(i'<st) & 3x[guy(i' ,x) coming-up' (i ' ,x) & 3i [kst & 
meet'(i,j ,x)]] ]tt = 3i' [i' 0 st & -,(i'<st) & 3x[guy(i' ,x) coming-up' (i' ,x) & 
3i[kst & meet'(i' ,j ,x)]] ] 
In this case, the evaluation time of the present tense is the ST, as in any independent 
sentence. The two available readings of the present tense occurring within relative 
clauses are thus accounted for. 
6 Note that the notion of implicit attitude advocated here is not the one implied by 
the traditional possible worlds approach to attitude reports. The kind of implicitness 
claimed here is conditioned to the existence of an inference on the basis of what 
would normally be taken for granted. To see this, compare this notion with the 
problem of equivalent beliefs . If a believes that Phosphorus is Phosphorus, in the 
traditional propositional account, a must also believe that Phosphorus is Hesperus,  
since the two propositions are necessarily true. The traditional account may argue 
that in a weak sense of belief as implicit belief, such inference may hold. Although 
there are theories of attitudes such as that proposed by Stalnaker ( 1 984, 1 987) that 
handle this puzzle within the possible world framework, this kind of inference 
would not follow from my notion of implicit attitude since it would not be normally 
assumed that anybody has complete knowledge of either astronomy or all the 
sentences that express the same proposition. 
7 The present version of this sentence was accepted by at least 6 speakers prompted 
with the relevant context. However, Some speakers do not accept it, even though 
they agree that it is better than ( 1 ) . 
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